Combined threat, different response

The nexus between Pakistan and China makes India’s border security challenges very complex; India’s response must address these complexities

The unpardonable loss of 20 Indian soldiers has shocked the entire nation. Despite the Galwan setback, India should not lose sight of the strategic challenges that lie ahead. If India seeks to play a dominant role in international politics, the military dimension of its response to China’s military provocation cannot be overlooked. How the Indian government thinks about the actual use of hard power is very important if we are keen to overcome the trauma suffered at the Galwan valley.

Without doubt, India needs a substantially smart and powerful military force. It is not enough to have sufficient arsenal and manpower, however; one needs to know how to use them wisely. Despite India’s growing economic strength and military strength, the multiple security problems from the nexus of China and Pakistan are rendered more complex in several ways.

As the latest developments along the disputed India-China border clearly indicate, China’s assertion as a great Asian power is felt most in the Himalayan region, followed by the maritime realm. China is also making clever use of the cyber power against India for sabotage and espionage. The necessary Indian approach has been to narrow the problem down, mainly to make it manageable. But although India may prefer to focus upon one problem at a time, the fact remains that Pakistan and China pose a combined problem for India.

As our retired and serving military commanders have claimed, India can fight a two front war. But it is not about a two front war; it is about Delhi’s seeming inability to prevent China from getting involved in the Kashmir question.

The Indian leadership should know that military credibility cannot be segregated issue by issue. So far, India has preferred to take a firm stand on issues pertaining to Pakistan, but we must understand that Pakistani threat is of second-order importance for India’s national security. If the government thinks that by taking a firm stand against Pakistan, India can make a strategic point, hoping to prevent a mighty challenge in the volatile Himalayas, it is a mistaken belief. China’s actions clearly indicate that it is determined to loom larger than ever in the entire Kashmir region.

It is true that a combination of deception, treachery and surprise has accompanied Pakistan and China’s use of force against India, yet Beijing has become far too sophisticated. Despite brazenly launching a coercive campaign to seize Indian territory in the disputed region, China has been trying to project its actions in defensive terms. However, nobody should be in doubt that by acting aggressively against India, China has decided to tip the balance of power to Pakistan’s advantage. China has given a message that it is now part of the Kashmir issue.

But that is not the whole problem as there is an inherent contradiction here. Although the external threat from the nexus of Pakistan and China are linked directly, it nonetheless requires differing responses, particularly in terms of hard power. To disrupt and counterbalance Pakistan, the best response may be some combination of intelligence operation, preemptive strikes, special forces raids, and diplomatic isolation. To balance China, India requires exceptionally strong military forces. But the problem here is not about the armed forces per se. The difficulty, rather, is that the kind of strategic mindset suited for one kind of threat is often unsuited for another.

In all countries, the decisions about the use of force are made by a very small number of politicians, military leaders, and their bureaucratic advisers. In other words, very few people have a role to play in deciding on the use of military force. And it really does not matter how large the country is, or how complex its military challenges may be. Despite what their political rivals at home might think, Indian decision-makers are generally as talented as their counterparts. The problem lies in that they are overwhelmed by the need to direct military operations against different adversaries, in different domains, using different means, and to different ends. This is a huge challenge to the rational use of India’s military power to support the country’s foreign policy.

For more than the last four decades, military power served India’s China policy less by its exercise than by its potential. That is why not a single bullet has been fired along the India-China boundary. However, with the violent clashes at the Galwan valley, this is no longer the case. Indian leadership must think both about the use of military power for deterrence and to shape a troubled peace. Delhi must think about how to use India’s hard power to deter Chinese aggression in the north, while countering Pakistan in the west by purely kinetic action. India may have to plan very hard for a short war with Pakistan, while hoping to deter China not to push too hard in the Himalayan region. However, the immediate priority must be to somehow get China to pull its troops back in eastern Ladakh.

India must have a decisive, deterrent conventional advantage over Pakistan. If that is developed in future, it will be easy to defeat Pakistan. But the real challenge comes from China, and India’s options are limited as China has begun to probe India’s military and political vulnerabilities. Therefore, India’s military power seems caught between opposing poles— actual use versus deterrence; achieving immediate objectives against Pakistan versus creating norms and rules with China. The complexity of India’s strategic purpose, and the limits of any system of using it, makes the challenges of wielding hard power as difficult as they have ever been.

Borderman

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