India and Pakistan Cross-border Terrorism: An Intensive Assessment of the Uri and the Pulwama Attacks
This paper comprehensively analyses the cross-border terrorism between India and Pakistan, focusing upon the Kashmir area, conducting detailed analysis of the Uri attack of 2016 and the Pulwama attack of 2019. It reiterates the facts of the conflict, detailing the eventst at the hands of terrorist organisations housed in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, namely the Jaish-e-Mohammed. The paper also delves into the effects of the attacks on India, outlining the aftermath of it on international relations and how they had responded to the attacks with diplomatic attacks and assaults of their own, such as the surgical strike on terrorist launchpads and the airstrikes at the Balakot district in Pakistan. The methodology and the known facts have been compiled to foster a better understanding of the functionality of the countries during cross-border conflicts.
Terrorism stands to be a massive plague to modern society, with an increasing number of states continuing to fall victim to it as it runs rampant across the world. Through terrorism and the subsequent violence it causes, organisations or even state governments seek to instil fear and exert their influence to further their national interest, achieve political and religious objective while contributing to the upliftment of their target ideology. This can be attributed to deliberate attacks upon military personnel, cross border skirmishes and sneak attacks, and at times, the targeting of civilians and non-combatant personnel. While it does cause the immediate damage to collateral and creates high number of casualties, the effect of terrorism reaches far beyond just the dimension of physical and visible damage since terrorists have often been characterised to engage in acts of violence that include a higher degree of people witnessing and watching the event unfold rather than the deceased, aiming for a surge in awareness among the society and people over the atrocities committed rather than causing a high number of casualties (Asthana, 2010). As a result, the taint of terrorism can be felt within the hearts of people all over the victim state, fostering an immense sense of fear, and terror, while completely obliterating any sense of security of the civilians within their own nation. Furthermore, it also leads to the deterioration of humanitarian rights and the very spirit of democracy and the values it propounds. Besides the monumental domestic hurdles that a state has to face, the degree of terrorism also affects the international hemisphere and global affairs in general, begging for caution in a world where the rules based international order has been trampled upon.
The long-standing and intricate relationship between India and Pakistan has been characterized by a tumultuous history of conflicts, disputes, and hostilities which owe their origins to the Partition. The failure to resolutely resolve these disagreements has broadened the scope of the entire conflict by further elevating existing conflicts while bringing in dimensions that trigger new conflicts. These stray further from traditional or structural kind of disputes, which has created a separate dimension of bilateral issues in the form of cross-border terrorism. Cross-border terrorism between India and Pakistan has long been a problematic topic, characterised by recurring acts of violence and military confrontation. The Kashmir issue, along with historical grievances and geopolitical pressures, has fostered the creation of numerous terrorist organisations. Terrorist groups including as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have used the porous border to enter and carry out attacks on civilian and military targets, compounding the two countries’ longstanding animosity. This paper will be going into comprehensive detail and analysis of two instances of cross-border terrorism, being the 2016 attack of the Jaish-e-Muhammad on the military camp at Uri, Kashmir as well as the 2019 attack on an Indian convoy of vehicles carrying Indian soldiers in the Pulwama district of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
The Attack at Uri
Termed as the worst loss of the Indian Army and security forces in over two decades, on September 18, 2016, an attack of terror by a group of four heavily armed militants had been conducted wherein they had breached the Indian Army’s 12th Brigade HQ military camp in the town of Uri of Jammu and Kashmir. Investigation into the attack had revealed that the infiltrators had been carrying AK-47 rifles equipped with highly destructive grenade launchers with over 50 incendiary grenades that had been designed especially to set off huge fires, thus putting in perspective the scale of their operation. Their target supposedly had been a temporary fuel depot that had been set up at the military camp that had contained hundreds of litres of highly inflammable petrol, diesel, and kerosene for trucks, gypsies, and for cooking. Moreover, adjacent to the fuel depot had been the temporary housings of the Indian soldiers within their canvas tents (India Today, 2019). Within three minutes, the militants had bombarded the camp with 17 grenades, giving rise to massive inferno in the tent area in a radius of about 150 metres, wherein 14 soldiers had been engulfed by the flames and had died instantaneously. And as four soldiers had tried to escape the blaze, they had subsequently been shot down by the terrorists, leading to a staggering loss of 18 soldiers with over 30 injured.
The attack had been orchestrated at a strategically spectacular timing wherein there had been movement within the Indian troops as the tenure of a battalion had come to an end and it was going to be replaced by another incoming battalion. Upon the explosions and the subsequent disarray, the armed militants had headed towards the soldiers’ barracks, which had remained empty due to their housing in the tents, during which, one of the militants had been shot down by and Indian soldier. Upon escaping towards the second floor of the barracks, the militants had held out for about six hours in the barracks, trading gunfire with the Indian army, until the arrival of Indian para-commandoes who had killed the remaining three terrorists. A detailed map with elaborate markings as well as the plan of action of the infiltrators had been recovered from their slain bodies, indicated in the Pashtun language; one of the tribal languages spoken in Pakistan. Upon inspection and investigation, it had been declared that upon finding items that had had Pakistani markings on the terrorists, that they had belonged to the terrorist organisation known as the Jaish-e-Mohammed (Negi, 2016).
The Aftermath
India had been devastated after the attack with feelings of nationalism spreading all throughout the nation and India-Pakistan relations plummeting to an all-time low. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had declared less than a week after that India will neither forgive nor forget. India continued to conform to its peaceful nature, not moving away from its historical political heritage of being a country that uses its military option to protect itself territorially only when all other choices have been exhausted. India had responded by boycotting the SAARC summit that would have been held in Islamabad in November, following the Uri attack which had been backed by Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Bhutan, leading to Pakistan being forced to postpone the would-be historical summit. Pakistan’s high commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, had been summoned on 21st September and had been given a protest letter detailing the involvement of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, which had been based in Pakistan, to which, Pakistan had denied the allegations.
Four days later, at the United Nations, India had declared Pakistan to be the host of the “Ivy League of terrorism” (Boone & Safi, 2016). This declaration had been denied by Islamabad, which had reiterated that there had been no evidence provided by India that linked the attack to Pakistan or its intelligence agencies. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had brought up concerns regarding human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Asif, had suggested that India itself had carried out the Uri attack to steer attention away from its struggles to quell popular disturbances in the Indian part of Kashmir. At this point in time, the Indian patience had run out and that the previously mentioned UN discussions had been the “inflection point” for the Indian army to begin the formation of a military response (Bhattacharjee, 2016).
The Surgical Strike
The talks had initially begun on September 22, wherein the Indian director general of military operations, Lt. General Ranbir Singh had briefed PM Modi, Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar, and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, exploring the options on the Line of Control, while paying heed to the posture of the Pakistani army as well, who had put all of its forces along the Line of Control on high alert, activating all radars. Through countless deliberations and debate, the option of the surgical strike was decided and chosen by September 24 upon close debriefing among the aforementioned personalities as well as the involvement of Army Chief General Dalbir Singh. Only communicating through highly confidential secured lines, the Army chief had tasked Lt. General DS Hooda, his Northern Army Commander to compartmentalize para special forces troops from the troops at his disposal and to train and prepare for the incoming exercise. All the while, the National Technical Research Organisation had set up and programmed satellites that conducted surveillance the target area using coordinates and link ups, which had furthermore allowed the headquarters at Delhi to possess real time imagery of the surgical strike through cameras mounted on the helmets of the Indian soldiers (Gupta, 2016). Ever since the confirmation of the strike, meetings were now being held covertly without the use of things like uniforms to make the people that had been involved stand out less. Since the surveillance of Pakistan had been on high alert and the radars had been working incessantly, an air raid using strike helicopters or fighter jets could not have been pragmatic. Instead, a land operation, with the Indian soldiers crossing the Line of Control on foot had been administered.
Squads of 30 soldiers each had been formed with each being assigned a specific target, armed with weapons such as Tavor 21’s and AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-fired missiles, Heckler and Kock pistols, high explosive grenades, and plastic explosives along with night-vision devices. Having chosen eight contingencies, D-day had begun with the squadrons of the special forces sneaking past the Line of Control. A plan had been formulated to coordinate all attacks and for each team to intercept and engage with the terrorists at once to cripple them from any chance at revenge or recovery. The threat of sentries at the enemy sites had been taken care of by the snipers before the main squadrons went in. Covertly crawling to the enemy sites, the special forces had conducted coordinated simultaneous firing to gun down the terrorists without meeting any resistance at all, and safely returning back to home territory. Having breached the Line of Control in the evening of 28th September, the Indian troops had successfully stepped back into their territory and into their bases by 9 am on September 29. The post mission briefing that had included the people who had initially formulated the plan, had outlined that seven terrorist launchpads had been decimated by Indian gunfire, with a casualty count of 45 in total at different locations (Gupta, 2016).
Beyond the Strike
Pakistan’s response to the strike had been that of denial, with the Inter-Services Public Relations, the Pakistani Army’s communication window, stating that there had been no such surgical strike by India, only confirming that cross-border firing had taken place. Pakistani officials had dismissed India’s claims as well, with Lt. General Asim Saleem Bajwa, a Pakistani army spokesman, stating that the reports of the surgical strikes by India had been “an illusion” and “a fabrication of the truth” (Barry & Masood, 2016). Furthermore, Pakistan had further reiterated that the idea of a surgical strike had been fabricated by India in order to create social media hype and influence public opinion, further specifying that if there is a surgical strike on Pakistan, the same would be responded with strength and rigour.
Within the cross-border firing, Pakistan had claimed that eight Indian soldiers had been killed, and that the Indian government had been concealing the casualty count from the public. They had also stated that an Indian soldier had been captured inadvertently crossing the LoC and entering Pakistani territory. Although the Indian government had confirmed the identity and the capture of one soldier, they had further classified that the capture had not been related to the strike conducted by them, and had stated examples of incidents of people crossing the frontier by mistake from both sides of the border. The soldier, Chandu Babulal Chavan, had been promptly returned to India (Haider, 2016). The surgical strike had been praised all across India, with all the political parties lauding the centre and the army for the valiant efforts. The public’s response had been highly positive and patriotic as well, elevating the degree of nationalism all across the nation. Since Pakistan had rejected the claims of the surgical strike, they had beckoned the Indian government for the proof, pointing out a lack of collateral damage and evidence.
The Pulwama Attack
Straying already fraught India-Pakistan relations, on 14th February, 2019, a suicide bomber rammed a car jam packed with explosives into one of the cars of a massive 78-vehicle Indian convoy carrying over 2,500 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel that had been travelling from Jammu to Srinagar on the National Highway 44. The ramming of the explosive-laden vehicle had caused an explosion that had killed 40 CRPF personnel of the 76th Battalion and had seriously injured numerous others (Gurung, 2019). Moreover, in a video released to social media, the terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammed had claimed responsibility for the attack while also showcasing the suicide bomber and the assailant, a 22-year-old man named Adil Ahmad Dar. Deemed as one of the deadliest attacks on the Indian forces, the Pulwama attack saw worldwide condemnations, while leading to a situation wherein a hot war seemed very probable between India and Pakistan.
The motive for the attack has been characterised to be as revenge of the suicide bomber for the humiliation by the Indian military as well as his past arrests, something that his father has also attested to (Siyech, 2019, pp. 6-7). Further motivation for the attack could have been attributed to the revenge for the death of Jaish-e-Mohammed’s leader’s son at the hands of the Indian security forces. Through the Pulwama attack, the Jaish-e-Mohammed had also been able to garner tremendous global attention of the international community, paving its influence exponentially through social media, and hence, exercising a conflict on such a massive scale had made more people aware about the existence and the functioning of the terrorist organisation. Additionally, the death of Adil Ahmad Dar had skyrocketed his popularity among the anti-Indian youth of Kashmir, elevating him to the stature of a hero and martyr, propagating a symbol of resistance and inspiring other youth to follow in his footsteps. This had been evident in the large number of Kashmiris who had turned up for his funeral, despite the government putting restrictions on the same (Siyech, 2019, p. 7).
The Aftermath
Regarded as a great tragedy for the country, with massive losses, India mourned for the loss of the soldiers. State funerals for the martyrs from Punjab had been held in their respective native districts, and a Guard of Honor had also been arranged at the time of their cremation (The Pioneer, 2019). Additionally, the government of Punjab had announced ex gratia compensation of 12 lakh rupees each to the families of the martyred soldiers from the state, as well as ensuring a government job to the next of kin (Times Now News, 2019). Besides the grieving nations, India had also decided to respond with a fire burning within its heart. Arun Jaitley, the former Finance Minister of India had declared that it would ensure the “complete isolation” of Pakistan and would use “all possible diplomatic steps” to cut it off from the international community. In that effort, India had called for global sanctions against the Jaish-e-Mohammed, after accusing it of having a direct hand within the attack in Pulwama, and had further tried to get Masood Azhar, the chief of the organisation, to be recognised as a terrorist within the United Nations Security Council (BBC News, 2019).
Moreover, India had also taken immense economic action against Pakistan by withdrawing its most favoured nation status that it had granted to it in 1996, according to which it had been obliged to treat it in a non-discriminatory manner, especially with regard to custom duty and other levies; something the Pakistani government had not reciprocated, until 2012, which it had to revoke once again due to domestic opposition. India had also raised the customs duty to 200% on all goods imported from Pakistan, which had included fruits, cement, petroleum products, and mineral ore (The Times of India, 2019). Parts of the Indian film industry had announced a ban on Pakistani artists in the Indian film industry as well as another ban on Pakistani artists in films and music produced in India. Indian sports broadcasters had also condemned the broadcast of the Pakistan Super League cricket matches. Kashmiris all over India had also been facing immense backlash in the form of forced evictions, violence, and harassment with even a handful of institutions of education forbidding the admission of Kashmiri students.
Balakot Airstrike: India’s Response
In response to the heinous Pulwama attack on the Indian forces, a new plan, codenamed “Operation Bandar” had been formulated to strike back at the territory of the Jaish-e-Mohammed. The objective of the operation had been to destroy terrorist camps of the aforementioned organisation, present in the town of Balakot in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan, about 50 kilometres away from the Line of Control. What had made this operation even more monumental had been the fact that this had been India’s first airstrike in Pakistan since the 1971 conflict, even though the jets had been optimized during the 1999 Kargil war. This strike had showcased India’s determination and a more radical approach towards counterterrorism, focusing upon the cross-border terror that had been stemming from Pakistani territory. This had marked a massive shift in India’s policies of inherent non-violence and restraining of using military options to fight cross-border conflicts, in an effort to not escalate the conflict to the full scale war, especially with both the nations possessing highly capable Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) (Purayil, 2022).
The first point of attack bad been at Jabha Top in the Balakot camp, at around 3:45 am, with the shelling and bombardment continuing for about eight minutes. The Indian Air Force (IAF) had employed its experienced pilot crew, robust fighter planes equipped with the latest set of weapons to conduct the air strike at the terrorist camp. The bombardment at the camp had stemmed from the IAF’s Mirage-2000 fighter hers that had been equipped with night vision, bolstered navigation capabilities, precision-guided munitions, advanced multi-mode multi-layered radar, and a fully electronic warfare suit (Singh, 2019). While 12 Mirage-2000’s constituted the main bulk and firepower for the operation, they and also been accompanies by four Sukhoi Su-30 aircrafts, employed for defence in case the Pakistani Air Force would decide to respond to India’s offensive. Furthermore, The Israeli Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the indigenous Netra Airborne Early Warning and Control System Aircraft (AEW&C) aircraft, that had been deployed to monitor the mission, had showed that no aircraft had been within 100 km while the operation was being carried out. The Mirage-2000 fleet had been given specific targets at the terror camp to attack with its precision-guided munition. These Balakot targets, determined based on intelligence inputs, had been targeted with the understanding that there had been no habitation and no risk of collateral damage.
The planes, which had also been effectively employed during the Kargil War, had been armed with SPICE-2000 (Smart Precise Impact and Cost-Effective guidance kit) and Crystal Maze Mark2 missiles, also known as AGM 142 Popeyes. Both of these weapons allowed the IAF to hit the target with precise accuracy (Singh, 2019). Pose the strikes had been conducted and considered to be a major success, the response of the Pakistan Air Force came the next day, which led to an aerial skirmish between the forces of the two nations. Advanced Pakistani fighter F-16’s had been employed to launch air-to-air missiles against Indian jets, to defend the air space and the Pakistani Mirage III’s that were being used for launching air to ground missiles in the attacks. While this battle ensued, the Indian Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman shot down a Pakistani F-16 while he had been piloting his MiG-21 Bison fighter plane, using an air-to-air missile. However, Pakistani retaliation claimed the plane of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, shooting it down too, with him ejecting into Pakistani territory. He had subsequently been captured by Pakistan, but returned back to India on the 1st of March (Wion News, 2023).
Conclusion
The cross-border conflicts between the two countries significantly highlight the complex and volatile nature of the relations between India and Pakistan. Both the Uri and the Pulwama attacks served as grim reminders of the deep-rooted animosity and the historical grievances between the two nations, further underscoring the urgent need for an effective counterterrorism measure as well as common and functional diplomatic engagement between the two nations. The involvement of non-state actors and terrorist organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed create massive concerns from India due to the nature of them having roots in Pakistan and their suspicions of the organisations being funded by the Pakistani government to conduct militant operations. Conflicts such as the Uri and the Pulwama attacks lead to an escalation in emotions and feelings vengeance, inching the countries closer to a full-scale war, with the danger of nuclear weapons looming right over the horizon. International collaboration in intelligence and law enforcement is critical, especially given the statelessness of certain terrorists. Terrorism can only be defeated by continued international cooperation and understanding (Asthana, 2010).
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