Vortex and dilemma of Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC)

Borderman | Posted on July 9, 2020 |

LoC and LAC are different boundaries but what joins them is their disputed nature and China-Pakistan nexus. The government must be prepared for two front war to defend India’s interests on both LOC and LAC

Territorial disputes exist all over the world because of undefined or improperly defined frontiers. Political claims and counter claims are connected with national sovereignty. In Indian context of line of control (LOC) with Pakistan and Line of Actual control (LAC) with China/Tibet autonomous region are two de-facto borders, which have defied solution.

Line of control (LC) originates from Munawar Tawi village Sangam area and ends at map reference NJ9842 is de-facto border between India and Pakistan. It came into existence as a result of UN brokered Karachi agreement of 01 January 1949 was designated as cease-fire line (CFL). Post 1971 Indo-Pakistan war agreement on 03 July 1972, cease-fire line (CFL) was re-designated as line of control (LC). It is one of the most dangerous borders where armies are face-to-face waiting for opportunity to strike at each other.

Line of actual control (LAC), the de-facto border between India and Tibet autonomous Region (TAR) is more complicated than line of control (LC) due to differing perceptions of alignment, claims, counter claims and it being neither delineated on map and ground. It encompasses Ladakh in northern sector, Uttrakhand, Himachal Pradesh in central sector, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh in eastern sector.

Line of control (LC) and line of actual control (LAC) are linked with each other as far as tensions between India, Pakistan and China are concerned. The trigger for tension is Indian sovereign territories under Pakistan occupation in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan and Chinese occupied Indian sovereign territories of Aksai Chin and Shaqsgam valley. The Parliamentary resolutions and declaration by Home Minister Amit Shah to take back territories occupied by Pakistan and China and abrogation of article 370 and 35A has further fuelled tension on line of actual control (LAC) and line of control (LOC). These territories were developed to further their economic and military interests against Indian sovereign interests. These territories are of great strategic interest to China and Pakistan as Xinjiang the Chinese province is connected with Tibet through Shaksgam valley and Aksai Chin and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Gwadar port passes through Gilgit-Baltistan. This was strategic connotation why Late Arun Jaitely turned down the Chinese offer of joining belt and road initiative as it would have amounted to accepting Chinese and Pakistani sovereignty over Indian territoriesand giving up our sovereign claim over them.

There is no copybook definition of line of control (LOC) and Line of actual control (LAC). Line of control can be termed as Politico military line agreed by military authorities and thereafter concurred by political executive of both nations is military control line between India and Pakistan which divides union territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh from Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Gilgit- Baltistan. This line is delineated on maps signed by military authorities does not constitute a legally recognised international boundary and serves as de-facto border. It is not sacrosanct.

Line of actual control (LAC) is term used for what has been cease-fire line between India and China. It separates Indian controlled territories from Chinese controlled territories though claims and counter claims exist over certain areas and alignment as perceived by respective nations is their claim line. The 1993 agreement of peace and tranquillity signed between India and China institutionalised the alignment and designated it as line of actual control (LAC). The purpose of designating it as line of actual control was to police the border on the pattern of border management of international border as defensive concept for maintaining peace and tranquillity all along line. Para Six of peace and tranquillity agreement says “Two sides agree that references to the line of actual control in this agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question” indirectly accepting disputed nature of Line of Actual control and agreement was meant to make border management workable to reduce tensions and maintain peace.

Line of control (LOC) and line of actual control both have their challenges, which are somewhat similar in nature with minor variations/ deviations. Operational preparations and alertness on the line of control is inversely proportional to spread of insurgency and LIC environment in the Union territory of J&K. The border management and defence of line of control is direct responsibility of Army. Army and Border Security Force are deployed on line of control with BSF working under army operational control. Operational preparedness on LOC has direct bearing on the insurgency and LIC environment in the state of J&K. Army and BSF have to ensure alertness to prevent infiltration to sustain proxy war and be prepared to fight conventional localised skirmishes, which may take place to change alignment of line of control. These challenges on line of control relate to high altitude terrain coupled with weather vagaries, lightening and avalanches. The maintenance on both fronts is difficult due to arduous routes, heavy snowfall which cuts off the areas is carried out through porters and ponies. There are many posts, which are air maintained by Indian Air Force. In addition, there are health hazards connected to high altitude terrain, which troops have to endure. The altitude ascends from valleys to low hills and goes up to twenty one/twenty two thousand feet.

Line of control have got eye ball to eye ball deployment in the form of permanent posts for tactical deployment to ensure sanctity of line of control and prevent enemy from tampering the alignment. Line of control also has non-tactical deployment for fighting proxy war and infiltration. The non-tactical posts are to cover large gaps to check infiltration. Fire assaults and artillery shelling on the posts and civilian areas is common on line of control to facilitate infiltration and demoralise civilian population. The infrastructure development on line of control is almost at par on both sides with Indian infrastructure better at certain places.

The line of actual control spreads from Ladakh to further east in Uttrakhand and Himachal to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh all along China/Tibet autonomous region (TAR). All along line of actual control, there are areas, which China claim as theirs due to differing perceptions of line and Chinese laying territorial claim over areas integral part of India. China does not recognise McMahan Line and claims complete state of Arunachal Pradesh and calls it as south Tibet. To strengthen its claim it has got involved in theatrics ignored by successive Indian governments.

One week before Chinese president’s visit, the Chinese ambassador Sun Yuxi setting aside diplomatic decorum claimed whole of Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory and said, “In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory and Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position.” China has opposed visits of Indian dignitaries to state of Arunachal Pradesh including Dalai Lama though New Delhi has ignored Chinese rhetoric.

It has issued stapled visas for Indian officials visiting China and in some cases even denied visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh thus highlighting there perception of state being a disputed territory. China has been issuing stapled visas to people from Jammu and Kashmir, and denied visa to Lt Gen B S Jamwal GOC-in-C Northern Command for official visit, thus bringing integration of state in Indian Union into question. It also has military presence in Gilgit-Baltistan region and constructed road through it, thus bringing accession of J&K in dispute and indicating bigger design of collaboration with Pakistan.

There are strategic and security repercussions of Chinese moves for India if seen holistically which have been ignored by India as recent happenings indicate. China is a new factor in bilateral Kashmir dispute. Dispute has now trilateral connotation in the western sector between India, Pakistan and China. Line of actual control dispute remains bilateral in central and eastern sector. Government of India realising Chinese design has refused to be part of Belt and Road Initiative of China. The repercussion is that interoperability between Pakistan and Chinese forces on land is possible. In the central and eastern sectors too Chinese has been nibbling and encroaching Indian land at will however, ambivalent policy of successive governments including the present one has led to series of military stand offs in Doklam, Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra Hills and Depsang where reportedly Chinese have entered into Indian territory. The current situation is the result of lack of firmness because of unpreparedness to fight due to capability issues.

The conception of Line of Control and Line of Actual Control was not immaculate. Line of control has witnessed two wars including Kargil for annexation of present union Ladakh. Line of Control is also exploited by state and non-state actors for continued infiltration taking advantage of thin deployment, difficult terrain and gaps to spread insurgency and destabilise union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly the issue of border with China has historical lineage got further compounded with Chinese takeover of Tibet, its non-acceptance of McMahan line and its perception of line of control alignment deep inside Indian territory which led to 1962 China India war. Even their after they have continued intrusion, transgression and nibbling of Indian territory especially in western and eastern sector which India has not been able to address effectively. Efforts have been made through various peace and confidence building agreements to address issue of transgressions by re-designating border with China as line of actual control so that each side sticks to area under its actual control on ground. However China has gone back on these agreements as the events of May and June 2020 in the area of Gawan Valley, Gogra Hills,Pangong Tso and Depsang valley indicate.

Armed Forces continuously carry out appreciation and swot analysis of adversaries in terms of war fighting capabilities for two front war. The ambit of such appreciation need to encompass intelligence community. Intelligence agencies need to be questioned for grey areas in their functioning. Based upon such appreciation, the capability building of armed forces should consistently be continued. Military leadership need to be provided everything in terms of equipment for fighting a two front war so that no adversary is able to pin prick India and cast an evil eye on Indian territorial integrity. Also important with this capability development is need to gradually pull back army from fighting proxy war so that focus of Armed forces totally remains on fighting conventional war.

Immediate need is to pay attention for strengthening security apparatus after carrying out detailed appreciation of military capabilities of Pakistan and China in all spheres of warfare. Military hierarchy needs to give professional advice to political executive of nation’s military capabilities and urgent need to strengthen armed forces.

Central border guarding forces also need to be integrated in terms of training, equipment and leadership to help army during peace and war on both fronts. Military leadership needs to project real picture of nation’s military capabilities to the government. Government has only two options to settle line of control (LOC) and line of actual military control (LAC) issue. Develop military capabilities on war footing to reclaim occupied and annexed territories or to settle issues in the spirit of give and take in the interest of lasting peace and development. We should hope that the government and military would take decision in the interest of peace.