Punjab Border: Analysing the need for a paradigm shift in strategy for effective border domination
Punjab has 553km international border with Pakistan: 500km land and 53km riverine border. The border belt extends up to 15km. Punjab encounters serious cross border threats due to its geostrategic location. The international border along Punjab has always been under the cloud of security and smuggling threats from across the border. Smuggling undermines national and regional security as it takes the form of drug, counterfeit currency and weapon smuggling. Pakistan has largely succeeded in its design to spread the poison of drugs in Punjab. To counter the threat, the operational strategy has to be practical and ground specific.
BSF has deployment on Punjab border from the north bordering J&K to the south bordering Rajasthan. Domination strategy is prepared based upon threat appreciation and lay of area. BSF domination is mostly manpower intensive with negligible technical surveillance support, and is made keeping lay of an area in mind instead of threat perception. The domination strategy has kept borders safe but more needs to be done to strengthen border security and surveillance. The shortcomings and grey areas in deployment and domination need addressing on priority.
The lay of the international border is set to a pattern. The surprise factor is missing from the deployment and domination being along the border road and fence. Deployment can be termed as patterned, predictable defensive deployment. It is discernible, negotiable and susceptible to breaches. It is defensive in design and conduct, and fatigues troops physically and mentally. It also sets in them defensive approach in conduct. There is an urgent need for BSF to revisit its deployment pattern on the Punjab border to make it more effective to prevent smuggling and make the hinterland safe from the menace of drugs. The shift from defensive to offensive deployment can be achieved by bringing in aggressiveness in design and conduct for both day and night.
Aggressiveness means being hawk-eyed along the international border and along the area ahead of the international border inside counterpart territory. Aggressiveness in deployment is achieved through human barrier, i.e. manpower, as well as artificial barriers that include fencing, flood control bunds ahead of fencing, plugging riverine gaps through a temporarily erected fence and water wing boats.
The most effective methodology to bring aggressiveness in deployment and domination is to institutionalise forward domination ahead of the fence both for day and night, and especially for the night. For this purpose, BSF has to carry out detailed reconnaissance of forward area between the fence and the international border to include high ground/ fingers, flood control bunds ahead of the fence and needs to rework deployment to achieve aggressiveness in design and conduct on ground.
It is imperative for the BSF to revisit outdated SOPs in order to instil aggressiveness in domination. The SOPs in vogue curb the initiative of junior commanders in the name of safety and security. The SOP is mute on forward deployment at night and there is practically no deployment ahead of the fence during both day and night, except Kisan guard and one odd operation ahead of fence for day and night. The mindset of commanders and troops is very defensive in the name of safety and security. Patterned movement once or twice ahead of the fence in a vehicle or on foot ahead of the fence is not of much use.
Units follow outdated SOPs more in breach and rightly so since these are outdated and impractical. None at higher headquarters are bothered about ground specific issues and read these SOPs, and thus remain mute to breach. SOP mandates shutting cobra current at the gate for movement ahead of fence at night. However, are there control switches at gates to shut the current to comply with the SOP? Unfortunately, there is no control switch to shut cobra current at gate, meaning that current in complete cobra is shut till the time party is ahead of the fence. However, the ground reality is nowhere current in cobra is shut. Is there an operational need to shut current in cobra wire? Higher headquarters are oblivious of impractical SOPs followed more in breach. All this shows the disinterest of higher headquarters in operational matters. A similar example: at night, an officer heads the party going ahead of the fence but there is a caveat that party must have intelligence representative. The requirement for an intelligence representative needs clarification. Such impractical provisions need to be undone. Similarly, a constable /head constable keeps watch on company commander /commandant at night. The SOP is an indicator of distrust of higher leadership in GD personnel. The mandatory provision of the only officer going ahead as party commander at night is bizarre and shows organisation in poor light and lack of trust in the professional competence of subordinate officers. An inspector can command a company but cannot go ahead of the fence. The rationale behind this organisation needs explaining.
I, as commandant, deployed personnel ahead of the fence in contravention of SOP since it was an operational need to achieve aggressiveness. However, once the issue came up for institutionalising the arrangement, frontier headquarters developed cold feet. Despite best efforts, neither was the go ahead given nor matter brought on record, giving a subtle signal that bold innovative operational initiatives are unwelcome and perforce have to be shelved. The old SOPs need revisiting and following need to be incorporated in SOPs-
- Make deployment ahead of fence mandatory especially during the night after identifying locations. Leave execution to battalion commandant instead of deciding from frontier /force headquarters.
- Shutting down current in cobra is not understandable in the current scenario.
- Officiating company commanders and sub Inspector platoon commanders be permitted to move ahead of the fence in their area of responsibility.
- Movement gate is opened at night, the creaking noise made as a result of poor maintenance created alerts every one including smugglers. Make weekly greasing and maintenance of gates mandatory.
- Lay down broad guidelines of weaponry and back up arrangements in case of an armed conflict/attack on the party ahead of the fence.
The old patterned surveillance equipment like binoculars, night vision goggles need immediate replacements with modern state of art equipment. The hand held thermal imagers (HHTIs) need immediate replacement. HHTIs manufactured for hand held mode, used in a rotatory role have outlived their life and need an immediate replacement for effective surveillance of the area. Their repair and replacement infrastructure is poor and insufficient. Units struggle with them at night since malfunctioning is common. None in top echelons is bothered about this operational problem. The training for operating surveillance equipment is unclear and needs immediate attention. The border flood light cables are old and need replacement. With modern equipment, there is an equal need to provide decent living accommodation, safe drinking water, and healthy and congenial living environment to troops at the border. Poor accommodation is a major cause of stress and operational lethargy amongst troops. The proper living environment acts as a force multiplier in operational success and is a stress buster.
BSF needs to revisit its policy of posting officers at operational headquarters, as staff officers including frontier commanders are oblivious to operational problems of units. Since Pathankot airbase attack, BSF insisted for maintenance of the strength of 500 plus strength at the border, which is practically impossible. Out of authorised strength of about 1200 men, every unit has about 150 vacancies. About 100 plus personnel are in quarantine and about 250-275 or so remain on leave /temporary duties. Battalion headquarters also need a strength of about 200 to run the administration of border-deployed troops. The total comes to about 725- 800 personnel or maybe little less with squeezing of leave and other commitments. How then could there be 500 plus personnel at the border? Everyone including professional staff officers at frontier and sector HQ know the ground reality. They need to take initiative to stop wrong practice along with sector and frontier commanders; however, there is no action on the ground by them.
Staff officers thus have to be bold, innovative, thinking and analytical, and understand and appreciate difficulties of troops on the ground and not ones caged to SOPs who forget flexibility to be an important quality for operational success. Do not post officers with laid-back approach who hinder battalion functioning. The experience tells that officers do not keep themselves abreast about peculiarities of the area, the threat pattern, deficiencies hampering battalion operational functioning and are indecisive and procrastinate thus making matters difficult for battalion commanders administratively and operationally. There is a need to have synergy between different branches of frontier and force headquarters, which is lacking. Administrative, intelligence and operational branches function in the caged environment looking inwards and not outwards. They must look outwards to improve coordination and efficiency.
Safe and secure borders represent a safe flourishing and peaceful nation. There is an urgent need to do away with shortcomings and grey areas, which hamper effective border domination. There is a need to post young and energetic commandants and innovative staff officers at the headquarters level. Revise outdated SOPs for bringing aggressiveness in deployment and domination by institutionalising forward domination ahead of the fence. It will make troops mentally strong and help in shedding defensive mind-set. There is urgent need to procure modern surveillance equipment and expenditure on securing borders. This should not be considered as wastage but an investment in securing the nation and sparking a productive environment.
Leave a Reply